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Göttingen  MAGKS Aging, Factor Returns,
and Immigration Policy




In this note we analyze how aging aects immigration policy. We set
up a dynamic political-economy model of representative democracy
in which the government of the destination country sets the immigra-
tion level to maximize aggregate welfare of the constituency. Aging,
i.e. a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an ex-
pansionary eect on immigration. This immigration eect may even
overcompensate the initial decline in population growth such that the
total labor force grows more strongly and the capital stock per worker
declines. We also compare our results to the social planner allocation
and to the median-voter equilibrium.
JEL classi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Virtually all industrialized countries are facing a substantial aging of the
native population, and immigration is often seen as one key instrument to
counteract this development. Against this background, our paper analyzes
how rich countries adjust their immigration policy in the wake of demographic
change. Point of departure is a dynamic model of representative democracy
with two overlapping generations. In each period the respective government
sets the immigration level to maximize aggregate welfare of both generations,
weighting each generation with its relative size. Due to its eects on factor
accumulation, immigration policy constitutes a sequential game between sub-
sequent governments. We derive the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) of
this game and analyze how a decline in the rate of population growth inu-
ences the equilibrium level of immigration. In our model (i) a MPE exists in
which the number of immigrants relative to the domestic workforce is time-
invariant, (ii) the government allows more immigration if the growth rate of
the native population declines, and (iii) the relationship between population
growth, factor intensities (and factor prices) may be non-monotonic.
Our paper builds on a few related approaches dealing with the political
economy of immigration policy. Benhabib (1996) examines immigration pol-
icy in a median-voter model with heterogeneous wealth endowments, whereas
Mazza and van Winden (1996) analyze redistribution and immigration poli-
cies under representative democracy. Unlike in our model, the setting in
Benhabib (1996) and Mazza and van Winden (1996) is entirely static and
therefore cannot account for the intertemporal eects of immigration policy
we focus on. Sand and Razin (2007) consider the inuence of aging on immi-
gration and social security policies in a dynamic median-voter model.1 In a
median-voter framework with two generations, equilibrium policies are deter-
mined entirely either by the young or the old voters' preferences { depending
on which generation is in the majority. In contrast to this rather extreme
outcome, our paper is able to capture the gradual shift in the political weight
toward the old generation which results from a decline in population growth.
1Other related papers that rely on the median-voter approach are Dolmas and Human
(2004), Ortega (2005), and Haupt and Peters (1998).
12 Equilibrium Immigration Policy
Our economic framework is a standard overlapping-generations model with
workers and retirees. In each period t, competitive rms produce a single ag-
gregate good with a Cobb-Douglas technology Yt = K
t L
1 
t . The workforce
Lt is composed of native workers Nt and immigrants, i.e. Lt = Nt(1 + t),
where t  0 is the ratio of immigrants per native worker. Capital depreci-
ates completely after one period. With ~ kt  Kt=Nt as the capital endowment
per native worker, factor returns are
wt = (1   )~ k

t (1 + t)
  and 1 + rt = ~ k
 1
t (1 + t)
1  : (1)
Young individuals in period t supply one unit of labor and allocate their
wage income wt to consumption and savings. Old individuals are retired and
consume all of their wealth st 1 (1 + rt).2 Utility of the old generation is given
by Uo
t = lnco
t  bt. The term co
t denotes the consumption level of the old and
bt are non-monetary costs of immigration. They represent, for example, an
increased heterogeneity of social norms and customs that may be perceived
as negative (see Hillman 2002 and Krieger 2005). For the young generation






that the young generation also anticipates costs of future immigration bt+1















wt (1 + rt+1) : (2)
Since ~ kt+1 = st=(1+n), the capital stock per native worker evolves according
to
~ kt+1 =
(1   )~ k
t (1 + t) 
(1 + n)(1 + )
: (3)
Immigration in our model is permanent, and immigrants gain the right to
vote after one period in the host country. Immigrants have the same number
of children as natives, and the immigrants' children are fully integrated into
the economy.3 With a population growth rate of n we have Nt = (1+n)Lt 1 =
(1 + n)(1 + t 1)Nt 1.
2For brevity and to focus on immigration policy, we neglect social security contributions
and benets. It can be shown, however, that introducing social security does not aect
our results if the government can set the level of social security transfers freely in each
period.
3The assumption that immigrants have the same number of children as the native
population considerably simplies our analysis. Otherwise, immigration would change the
relative size of both generations in subsequent periods.
2To derive the political economy equilibrium, we assume a representative
democracy in which the government in period t sets t to maximize
Wt = V
o






t denote the indirect utilities.4 In (4) the size of the old
generation is normalized to one, and the young generation's utility is weighted
with its size relative to the old generation.
The sequence of events is as follows: at the beginning of each period t the
respective government decides on the immigration rate t. Production takes
place after immigration, and nally young individuals decide how to allocate
their wage income to consumption and savings.
We refer to the concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium to nd an equi-
librium of this game between successive governments (see e.g. Krusell et al.
1997 or Forni 2005). More specically, we are searching for a policy rule
(~ k) such that t = (~ kt) maximizes W(~ kt;t;~ kt+1;t+1). The immigration
rate t+1 in the following period has to be given by the same optimal pol-
icy rule, i.e. t+1 = (~ kt+1), and the intertemporal accumulation of capital
~ kt+1 = ~ kt+1(~ kt;t) is determined by (3). Given our model specication we can
show that a very simple policy rule with the property d=d~ k = 0 constitutes
a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Young and old have conicting preferences concerning immigration: Set-















  b : (5)
Taking the rst derivative of Wt and inserting (5) we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 1 A Markov-perfect equilibrium exists, and the immigration









According to (6) the equilibrium policy rule satises our previous con-
jecture d=d~ k = 0. Equilibrium immigration policy is thus time-invariant.
For all  > 0 we nd that d=dn < 0. This is because the weight of the
old generation, which benets from immigration in our model, declines in n.
4This objective function can be motivated by a probabilistic voting framework as in
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or Coughlin et al. (1990).
3Population aging { a decline in the population growth rate n { thus leads to
more immigration.
From (6) we can derive the equilibrium growth rate l of the labor force in









In the parameter range dened by (7), the immigration eect is so strong
that aging causes an increase in the growth rate of the total labor force.
The capital intensity per worker (native and immigrant), i.e. kt  Kt=Lt
or kt = ~ kt=(1 + ), can be obtained from (3). Setting kt = kt+1 we can









Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between n and k for  = 0:35,  =
0:75 and b = 0:1. We see that this relationship is non-monotonic. For small












Figure 1: Population Growth and Steady State Capital Intensity
n we have dl=dn > 0 and consequently, dk=dn < 0. If, however, n exceeds
a certain threshold value, the capital intensity increases in n. Finally,  = 0
4for large n, causing the capital intensity to fall in the population growth rate
as in a world with exogenous immigration.
Note that immigration in all periods is higher than in the case of a social
planner, who also accounts for the welfare eects of immigration policy on









s + (1 + n)lnc
y
s   (2 + n)bsg ; (9)
which is the discounted sum of all current and future native generation's
utilities. The solution to this maximization is given by
1 + 
SP =
1   (1 + n)   (2 + n)
(1   (1 + n))(2 + n)b
: (10)
Comparing SP with the equilibrium immigration rate  yields  > SP.
For a further interpretation we may also compare our equilibrium with
the outcome in a median-voter setting. The equilibrium policy in a median-
voter model either maximizes the welfare of the young (for n > 0) or of the
old generation. An interior solution with  > 0 is only possible in the latter
case. As long as the identity of the median-voter remains unchanged, aging
does not inuence immigration policy at all in such a setting.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this note we have analyzed the eects of population aging on immigration
policy in a representative democracy model with two overlapping generations.
We have shown that aging has an expansionary eect on the chosen immigra-
tion level. To obtain further insights, our model can be extended into various
directions. For example, it may account for the fact that immigrants often
have more children than natives, or it may incorporate dierent skill levels
of workers. In addition, the predictions of our theoretical model regarding
the eects of aging on immigration policy can be tested empirically.
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